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insecure incomes, few assured enterprise or state
benefits, and a lack of occupational careers.1
The result was a consumption binge. But when
the financial crisis came in 2008, the reality of
huge deficits the bargain had allowed to build
up became clear, and inequalities were greater
than at any time in recorded history.
To appreciate the extent of what has happened,
it is useful to think of the idea of social income –
or income from all sources – which varies by
group and over time. Social income comprises:
wages or other money earnings, enterprise non-
wage benefits (including bonuses, paid holidays,
The Faustian pact
As globalisation took off in the 1980s, two trends
were unleashed. By opening up to ‘emerging
market economies’, governments of rich coun-
tries launched a process that increased the bar-
gaining position of capital, reinforced by a
trebling of the global labour supply that made
the functional distribution of income much more
unequal. It also began a process of conver-
gence. Wages in low-income countries would
rise only slowly because of their huge labour
surplus and vast scope for increases in produc-
tivity. This exerted strong pressure on wages
and benefits in rich countries, pushing them
towards a global mean well below what workers
in the UK had come to expect. 
But while labour costs had to come down to
stay ‘competitive’ and to retain jobs, sharp falls
in workers’ living standards would have been
politically and socially intolerable. Under pres-
sure from employers, from orthodox econo-
mists and from international financial agencies,
successive governments opted for a strategy of
‘labour market flexibility’, by which they hoped
to make labour cheaper in Britain, so attracting
investment to generate jobs. But flexibility
meant making a growing number of workers
and their families more economically insecure
and more likely to experience declining wages
and shrinking benefits.
Flexibility spelled social danger. So, a Faustian
bargain was made, by which government would
top up declining wages and shrinking benefits
through subsidies and tax credits, while it redi-
rected social protection from an emphasis on
social solidarity and social insurance, unsus-
tainable in a flexible labour market, to means-
tested social assistance directed at the
deserving poor. Access to cheap credit further
cushioned the underlying decline in living stan-
dards among the emerging ‘precariat’, a class in
the making, not an underclass – a multitude of
people living bits-and-pieces lives, having short-
term or casual jobs interspersed with periods of
unemployment or labour force withdrawal, with
During the past three
decades, Guy Standing argues,
politicians struck a Faustian
pact. In return for ‘labour
market flexibility’, government
would top up declining wages
through subsidies and tax
credits and redirect social
protection from an emphasis
on social solidarity and social
insurance to means-tested social assistance. In the
aftermath of rioting, they must now face the
following fact: it is the economic policies they have
supported that are a major cause of the underlying
malaise. If they do not, they will find themselves
acceding to an increasingly coercive and punitive
social policy, epitomised by workfare and the vogue
term of ‘conditional welfare’. Politicians must step
back from the utilitarian direction in which they
have taken us during the past thirty years and
consider an alternative road. 
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The fact that a
rising number of
children living in
poverty had parents
in jobs epitomised
the flexibility
agenda’s failure
credits, which moderated poverty and unem-
ployment traps but encouraged the decline in
wages they were ostensibly meant to top up.
They also encouraged collusion between
employers and workers: it mattered less if
wages were cut, since they could be topped up. 
The loss of non-wage benefits as well as money
wages generated a further deterioration in
social income. Thus, the incentives to take jobs
continued to decline for the precariat. More
people became demoralised and experienced
social illnesses, contributing to the popular
image of ‘broken Britain’. A combination of
lower wages, fewer enterprise benefits, more
conditional state benefits and a shrinkage of
social mobility through occupational disman-
tling created a recipe for social discord and
petty criminality in deprived communities,
watching the conspicuous consumption of
celebrities and the salariat. Under New Labour,
more of the losers in the flexible economy were
criminalised, and the incarceration rate rose to
unprecedented levels. 
In sum, the Faustian pact enabled government
to oversee the growth of a precariat, while it
constructed the pillars of workfare to deal with
the inevitable failings of means testing.
Politically, the strategy could satisfy the under-
lying utilitarian ethos as long as there was eco-
nomic growth and low unemployment, with only
a small minority on the receiving end of com-
pulsion and benefit cuts. But the growth model
was unsustainable. Budget deficits were build-
ing up and too many people were living on the
edge. By 2008, while the elite and salariat were
wallowing in unparalleled affluence, the precari-
at’s debt and insecurity were also unparalleled.
The fact that a rising number of children living in
poverty had parents in jobs epitomised the flex-
ibility agenda’s failure. Jobs were not the route
out of poverty for a growing number of people.
The Faustian pact had run its course.
The collapse of the bargain
The financial crash revealed that British society
was teetering on economic insecurity without
policies to protect the vulnerable in a downturn.
For those on the bottom rungs, there were no
incentives to seek jobs: wages were low, jobs
were scarce, temporary or dead end in charac-
ter, and poverty traps were as strong as ever.
The austerity regime that followed further
reduced social income alongside a savage
shrinking of the public sphere. 
The rising number in poverty traps, combined
with a bewildering array of complex rules, ren-
dered it financially disadvantageous to do what
subsidised housing, occupational pensions and
parental leave), state benefits, community ben-
efits (support from family and local and occupa-
tional communities) and private benefits (from
savings and investments). During the welfare
state era (between 1944 and 1975), state and
enterprise benefits rose sharply, reducing the
wage share of social income, and displacing
informal community benefits, which withered as
most people came to rely on employers and
government. 
Then the era of labour market flexibility ushered
in a restructuring of social income. Corporations
and government facilitated a shift from money
wages to enterprise benefits for the salariat
(those receiving salaries rather than wages),
while making labour in the lower echelons more
flexible, stripping enterprise benefits from the
emerging precariat, converting part into money
wages in concession bargains, removing others
without compensation. Meanwhile, because of
the financial markets, private benefits surged
for the salariat and the rich.
The growth of wage inequality concealed a
greater growth in social income inequality. In
addition, commercialisation, privatisation and
fees to access public amenities and services
turned aspects of ordinary living from being part
of ‘community benefits’ to being costs that low-
ered social income for the precariat.
Two other aspects should also be emphasised.
First, flexibility expanded the precariat, resulting
in millions more in precarious jobs and housing,
living a life of constant change, exhorted to be
flexible but denied social mobility through an
occupational career, and stripped of elements
of social income that had given some economic
security. Second, social policy became an
instrument of the market, focusing on promoting
labour and ‘employability’ rather than strength-
ening social solidarity and curbing inequality.
The language shifted from rights to ‘entitle-
ments’ and ‘responsibilities’. But the trend to
means testing guaranteed a drift to workfare. If
labour markets were made more flexible, wages
and benefits in the less ‘skilled’ segments would
fall, which meant the ‘income replacement rate’ of
benefits would rise. This led to a rationalisation
for cutting benefits and restricting ‘entitlement’ to
them. Influential economists used it to argue that
government should reduce ‘the generosity of
benefits’. This was deceitful. Of course the
replacement rate would rise if wages were falling.
As flexibility and means testing spread, govern-
ment used subsidies and means-tested tax
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most would have liked – work for an income –
and created powerful incentives to work in the
shadow economy, earning a little on top of ben-
efits. This allowed the government to depict
claimants as ‘lazy’, ‘scroungers’ and accuse
them of having a ‘worklessness culture’. 
The only way the strategy could be preserved
was to make conditions for entitlement to state
benefits even tighter, make the coercion even
stronger and make the punitive character even
clearer. But by this stage, there was something
else: the ‘precarity trap’. 
The precarity trap
The precarity trap arises because a system that
is increasingly interventionist, ‘active’ and direc-
tive involves ‘clients’ having to do a rising amount
of ‘work-for-labour’, at considerable cost, with
low returns and in stigmatising discomfort.
Flexible labour markets have vastly expanded
the precariat. The value of state benefits has
dropped, egged on by the media and others
outraged at their ‘generosity’. The stripping of
social income has meant that the real poverty
traps have grown, in spite of tax credits, leaving
the average member of the precariat with an
effective marginal income tax rate of at least
double that faced by the salariat and the sup-
posedly squeezed middle. 
But because successive governments have
increased the system’s complexity, a nasty set
of precarity traps has been erected. Imagine
you are in a low-wage job, with modest ‘in-
work’ benefits. You lose the job, or it comes to
an end. You have financial obligations and
debts start piling up. You apply for benefits,
commute to offices, queue, find you do not
have the correct documents, answer inquisitive
questions; you answer some of them incorrect-
ly, perhaps out of fear of breaching some con-
dition for entitlement. You must return the next
day; you wait, you fill out more forms. Meanwhile,
you must prove you are searching for a job,
even though you are convinced none are avail-
able. All this uses up a lot of time, a lot of scarce
money and a lot of scarce morale and energy.
At the end, after weeks, suppose you obtain
entitlement to benefits. You have used up cred-
it with friends and relatives, debts have grown,
morale has ebbed. If you are a normal person,
you will be seething with resentment and
shame. Suddenly, you are told there is a job on
the other side of town. You anticipate it being a
temporary minimum-wage job, with no prospect
of it being a stepping stone into a long-term
‘career’. The cost of the bus and the strain of
the application process add to the unattractive
prospect. And then there is a precarity trap.
Suppose you took the job, and your expecta-
tion that it would not last proved correct. You
would have to start all over again, applying for
benefits, proving diligence and being obse-
quious to officials, who are paid to be suspi-
cious and to ask tricky questions. Once again
you would be in an impoverishing situation. 
The precarity trap involves zig-zagging between
temporary jobs and applying for benefits with
heavy costs in between that may be a greater
deterrent to labour force activity than the pover-
ty trap, meaning that many moving from bene-
fits into temporary jobs lose substantially. 
In that situation, is it rational to opt for that low-
wage temporary job? Would you?
Workfare and ‘conditional welfare’
While precarity traps grew before the financial
crash, they have become endemic, and should
be crucial to what is the most striking outcome
of the collapse of the Faustian bargain, which
goes under the misleading name of ‘workfare’. 
The steps to workfare have been well sum-
marised by Sharon Wright in Poverty 139. Near
equivalents have been the resort of political
establishments in previous eras of structural
transformation, such as the Speenhamland sys-
tem, designed to keep down wages and oblige
the poor to labour, which gave way to the Poor
Law of 1834, and the mix of coercion and ther-
apy to deal with women’s ‘nerves’ at the end of
the nineteenth century.
Workfare was the inevitable outcome of labour
flexibility policies combined with means-tested
assistance. As wages fell and as the poverty
trap spread, more people had no incentive to
take the jobs available. They had to be driven
into them. But tighter conditionality, with more
demands placed on claimants, seems to have
no limit. The drift from conditions supposed to
favour claimants to conditions that are punitive
is inexorable. A utilitarian ethos drives the
process. For the happiness of the ‘middle
class’, the perceived majority, misery of a
minority can be tolerated. Gradually, the drift to
workfare is turning social policy towards social
engineering. Instead of providing security and
economic freedom, benefits are being used to
reform people, ostensibly for their own good
and long-term happiness.
Conditional welfare has become popular with all
main political parties. It is linked to a school of
thought known as libertarian paternalism, an
oxymoron that claims that people need to be
The precarity trap
involves zig-
zagging between
temporary jobs and
applying for
benefits with heavy
costs in between
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‘nudged’ to behave in ways that are for their
own good. Even on its own terms, there is no
evidence that workfare succeeds. It is presented
as a means of saving public funds. This is a lie.
The ‘saving’ in cutting the benefits of a few 
people and putting them in unproductive jobs is
dwarfed by the administrative costs. It does not
offer a road of social integration and skill creation.
Policymakers should step back and ask what
ethical criteria should be used to evaluate the
steps on the road to workfare. Start with the
basic liberal principle. Clearly, a punitive work-
fare policy cannot improve the security of the
most insecure groups in society. It increases
their insecurity and the pressures under which
they have to live.
Second, if one believes that, a priori, paternalis-
tic social policy is an infringement on liberty,
then if controls are placed on some groups that
are not placed on others, it cannot be called
socially just. 
Third, if civil servants and commercial agencies
are given discretionary power to decide
whether someone receives benefits or not, that
is socially unjust. This is what is happening.
Politicians might say claimants have a right of
appeal. But the power relationship usually pre-
cludes this, while the prospective cost and low
likelihood of success in a system designed to
curb benefit expenditure and penalise claimants
will deter many from appealing, even if they have
a legitimate grievance.
If governments create complex systems with
conditionalities and punitive measures, they will
create more scope for errors. It is characteristic
of the cosy consensus of the political main-
stream that errors by claimants are typically
depicted as fraud. Henceforth, all errors are to
be penalised, on the dubious ground that this
will promote a sense of ‘responsibility for public
funds’. In fact, there is no evidence of extensive
fraud; it is mainly errors resulting in overpay-
ments and underpayments, most committed by
officials, not claimants. And according to the
government’s statistics, tax fraud by the rich is
ten times as much as benefit fraud by the poor.
Rough justice without due process for the poor
and insecure; rather less attention to the bigger
problem caused by the rich. 
One of the worst features of the road to work-
fare is how governments have turned selected
citizens into social policy agents. For instance,
encouraging GPs to provide ‘wellness notes’
alters the doctor-patient relationship of confi-
dentiality. Encouraging neighbours to report on
suspected ‘cheats’ chips away at community
solidarity. Allowing a commercial company to
determine whether someone is eligible for ben-
efits empowers a corporation at the expense of
the low-income person. 
However, it is mainly because of the combina-
tion of poverty and precarity traps that workfare
will become more punitive. For workfare sets
out to overcome claimants’ rational behaviour
and attitudes. The irony does not stop there. 
A consequence of the traps is an expansion of
the ‘transgressing poor’, those to be denied
benefits and forced to do onerous labour
because they are deemed to have behaved irre-
sponsibly and broken the law. Once cate-
gorised as deviant, claims about giving them a
‘second chance’ become bogus. In today’s
panopticon society, data on past miscreant
behaviour becomes credentialist criteria block-
ing off avenues into society’s mainstream. At
best, the transgressing poor will remain on the
lower rungs of the precariat; at worst, they will
drift into a lumpen precariat, surviving on the
streets, with social illnesses beckoning. Some
will lash out ‘mindlessly’. Mephistopheles might
smile at that. 
Conclusions
Workfare and the recent riots are the endgame
of the collapse of the Faustian pact entered into
by both New Labour and its predecessors. The
logic of workfare and conditionality will lead to
more coercion and punitive ‘prisonfare’, with
society permanently on the edge of outbreaks
from the growing army of the insecure. Another
road must be taken. We need a social protection
system that has as its base a genuine universal
credit in the form of a basic income, without
conditionality or the punitive garb of workfare. 
Meanwhile, there should be an independent
assessment of workfare. In August, after the
riots, there were calls by politicians for a public
enquiry. But because successive governments
have agreed on the direction of social and
labour policies, it would be a whitewash if such
an enquiry was dominated by politicians or their
representatives. Ideally, an independent com-
mission should be set up by one or several
foundations, with a wider range of backgrounds
than one encompassing the three main political
parties. In that regard, the precariat itself should
be represented from within its ranks, to give
credence to the notion of ‘active’ participation
by all groups in society.  
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